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INTRODUCTION: RESILIENCE AND THE HISTORY OF URBANISM
As we begin a conference entitled “History Urbanism Resilience,” I see my role as articulating some of the ways 
that the concept of “resilience” contributes to the history of urbanism—and to explore how the history of 
urbanism helps complexify our understanding of resilience. Resilience as a term has become both increasingly 
ubiquitous and increasingly contested. my remarks today will both explain this and, ultimately, defend the value of 
the concept--as long as we approach it critically. A first observation: putting the word “Resilience” in the title of the 
IPHS conference seems to have worked. The word appears in the names of 12 different conference sessions, and 35 
separate papers use the word in their titles. So, either “resilience” is an inspiring frame for our thinking, or many 
of us are just extremely dutiful--or strategically adept--at providing conference organizers with what we think 
they want to hear. I suspect that there is some of each at work here. more importantly, this combination of utility 
and malleability accounts for much of the burgeoning appeal that the term “resilience” seems to have. Are we all 
talking about the same thing? Probably not, though there is certainly some reasonable degree of commonality. A 
quick perusal of the titles in the IPHS conference program suggests that we are, collectively, applying the idea of 
resilience to architecture, communities, and metropolitan form, and that it is applied in many contexts of social, 
environmental and political change, frequently including sudden disruptions caused by disasters or warfare. 
In the spring of 2002, following on the 9/11 attacks in the United States, a colleague and I ran a semester-
long colloquium that we called “The Resilient City: Trauma, Recovery, and Remembrance.” We wanted to look 
back at a variety of traumatic urban events from around the world to see how governments and their citizens 
had responded. How did recovery from traumatic events get conceptualized and how did these events get 
memorialized? Did it matter whether the cause was earthquakes or floods or wars or terrorist attacks? In other 
words, what could we learn from the history of post-traumatic urbanism that might help us conceptualize what 
might happen post- 9/11? my colleague Tom Campanella and I commissioned a series of papers exploring how 
cities (and their citizens) had historically recovered from sudden traumatic events—not just from terrorism, but 
from other abrupt events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and wars. We quickly learned that, while it was possible 
to chart something called “disaster recovery,” that concept was hardly straightforward. In the past 200 years, 
virtually every large city in the world that experienced a disaster or war seems to have been rebuilt, no matter how 
extreme the level of destruction or loss of life.
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From the immense losses suffered in cities such as Warsaw, Berlin, and Hiroshima during the Second World War 
to the total devastation of the earthquake in Tangshan, China—which may well have killed upwards of a half 
million people in 1976—cities came back.
In a world of nation-states (instead of city-states), there has been a new institutionalized form of what might be 
called caring-at-a distance. Since the late 18th century, cities have been much less likely to be left to fail on their 
own. The central leadership of a nation-state has, instead, invested in the restoration of its own damaged parts—
and this pattern has been dramatically extended in the 20th century, with the tripling in the number of nation-
states and the reduction in the number of widely dispersed empires. Coupled with corresponding rise of the 
global insurance industry (and re-insurance industry), and the rise of charitable donations (often linked to larger 
geopolitical strategies), post-traumatic urbanism had entered into a new phase of its history. Instead of the “lost 
cities” of the ancient world, we now have a planet where cities have been, almost inevitably, rebuilt. And, almost 
always, they get rebuilt in the same place as before—irrespective of underlying faults (and irrespective of whether 
those faults are geophysical or political). And--though it might take decades--most of these cities have indeed 
regained or surpassed the previous, pre-trauma, amount of building stock. most reached their previous level of 
economic activity, and most eventually surpassed their pre-trauma population. Whether we are talking about 
Chicago’s Great Fire of 1871 or San Francisco’s famous earthquake and fires of 1906, or Tokyo following the Great 
Kantō earthquake of 1923 and the firebombing of 1945, famously destroyed cities are now still famous and much 
larger.
Still, to call such rebuilding of “urban recovery” does little justice to the profound complexity of the task. Saying 
that a city has “recovered” from traumatic destruction is hardly a neutral or simple judgment. Who gets to define 
it? Whose recovery matters?
All too much of the disaster recovery literature has chosen to ignore issues of politics and power, as if excluding 
such factors would somehow make the analysis seem more ‘scientific’. I was recently asked to review a draft 
article, entitled “Resilience and Sustainability in Relation to Natural Disasters” proposed for inclusion in a major 
reference book. The 13,000-word study, rooted in perspectives chiefly drawn from engineering, touched on politics 
only in passing, and the only form of “power” mentioned referred to electricity. Historians know better, as do 
the planners, developers, service providers and city officials who work in such complex socio-political settings. 
Richly realized case studies of past struggles to overcome traumatic events reveal the intricate overlays between 
infrastructure systems and political systems.
many accounts of disaster recovery processes rely on some version of the model developed in the 1970s based 
on analysis of chronologies of post-earthquake and post-hurricane aftermaths in the United States and latin 
America. Traditional models of urban recovery can come close to describing what is happening in the built 
environment—this one identifies successive phases labeled emergency, Restoration, Reconstruction I, and 
Reconstruction II. The chart provides a useful means for tracking such indicators as “clearing rubble from main 
arteries” and attaining “predisaster level of capital stock and activities,” but everything here is treated as a single 
generalized aggregate of civic activity. The authors measured what could be most easily measured, and found that 
each of the four phases lasted about ten times as long as the previous one; a one week emergency would translate 
into a ten week restoration period, and a one hundred week initial reconstruction phase. (Since the scale here is 
logarithmic, the curves seem to cover roughly equal intervals.) The model captures a lot, but it is precisely what 
is missing here that underscores the psychic distance between simple recovery and more complex and holistic 
notions of resilience.
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RESILIENCE IN STORIES, SYMBOLS, AND pOLITICS
I see three principal things as missing from a more engineering centered model of recovery: stories, symbols, 
and politics.
First, many descriptive accounts of urban recovery processes fail to ascribe agency, or define it too narrowly. We 
learn a sequence of events, but we do not see who has led them, let alone with what motives. Do decisions merely 
transmit the will of the highest levels of the state, or do grassroots pressures sometimes matter? Who gets to 
tell the story of the trauma and who gets to frame the narrative of recovery? When is it a narrative of progress? 
When is it a tale of redemption? And when is it what edward linenthal calls “the toxic narrative”1—rooted in life-
altering traumas that cannot be overcome? What role is there for community-based media—versus mainstream 
media-- in the articulation of the struggle and response to urban trauma? I have a current doctoral student, Aditi 
mehta, whose entire dissertation explores this question, focusing on a comparison between Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans and Superstorm Sandy in New York. In the early 21st century, cities are full of bloggers and citizen 
journalists. Cities are stages for technologies such as low-powered Fm radio and Wifi mesh networks. They host 
systems of social networking sites and offer opportunities for participatory documentaries. The media may have 
changed, but the underlying question is old and persistent: Whose voices matter?
Similarly, just as conventional recovery models assume some centralized direction and uniform experience 
that ignores the varieties of voice, so too do such models miss the power of symbolism. Strategically selected 
reconstructions of a destroyed built environment play particularly important roles in signaling to a traumatized 
public that positive change is taking place—that we will, in the near-ubiquitous phrase, “build back better.” 
Conversely, however, the symbolic priorities may underscore an over-eagerness to return to the status quo 
ante; nothing more, nothing less. In other words, it is not just that rubble has been cleared or that some “pre-
disaster level of capital stock” has been regained; it is that specific, culturally relevant, publicly visible, activities 
have resumed.
In post-Katrina New Orleans, for instance, despite the extreme levels of residential devastation, city officials made 
certain that the downtown Superdome was repaired in time for the start of the 2006 National Football league 
season. Similarly, six months before that, city and neighborhood leaders sent the message to the world that mardi 
Gras celebrations would go on just as they had in the antediluvian past.
These matters of symbolism and story-framing point to a third element that conventional notions of “urban 
recovery” often miss: the politics of redevelopment. Narratives of resilience are a political necessity, but they are 
always contested. Which aspects of “recovery” get prioritized? Who decides the primacies for investment when 
there are so many choices? Who negotiates and controls the politics of redevelopment, and who benefits from 
available funding? Which places, and which people, lag behind? When funding comes from outsiders, which 
things do they prefer to fund?
Sudden urban traumas reveal key insights about the nature of a polity—not just the heroism of individuals, but 
the priorities of a society. Who rebuilds what, where, and for whom? Despite the differentiated landscape of urban 
recovery, we frequently ignore the obvious clues about narrative voice (or lack thereof), architectural symbolism, 
and political favoritism.
If “recovery” is an inadequate term to describe the complexity of post-trauma urbanism, perhaps the more 
multivalent term resilience might be more useful? At the time of our colloquia sessions in Spring 2002 on 
“The Resilient City,” resilience was not a term one typically associated with cities. It was, instead, a term from 
psychology used to refer to the inner strength of certain individuals, and it was a term used by engineers to refer 
to the capacity of certain materials to return to their previous form following a perturbation. And it was also, 
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increasingly, a term being used by ecologists to refer to properties of ecosystems that could be disrupted into non-
equilibrium states. But the ecologists were talking about systems that were largely non-human (though certainly 
impacted by humans) so talk of non-equilibrium in ecosystems did not immediately translate into talk about socio-
economic inequalities.
THE UBIQUITY OF “RESILIENT CITIES”
Our ‘Resilient City’ sessions proved to be productive intellectual testing ground for the concept of resilience. 
eventually, in late December 2004, we released a book called “The Resilient City: How modern Cities Recover 
From Disaster.” Oxford University Press deserves some credit for timing the publication of the book to coincide 
exactly with the Asian tsunami--and then they got it into bookstores just in time for Katrina and the levee failures 
to hit New Orleans the following August.
By the time we completed the “The resilient city” book—reacting to what our various chapter authors had 
found—we were ready to question all three words of the title—even the “the”. The book didn’t have a question 
mark in the title, but I’ve added one here to underscore the kinds of questioning we undertook. What constitutes 
resilience? Who counts as “the city”? And do the trajectories of cities share enough in common to warrant 
speaking of something called “the” resilient city—as opposed to a less catchy title like Some Partially Resilient and 
Highly Differentiated Cities: How Some Portions of Modern Cities Recover from Disaster Better Than Others. Still, I 
am far from ready to drop the analytical utility of the term resilience. Although in 2002 few urban leaders facing 
the aftermath of disaster were yet using the actual word ‘resilience,’ our collective analysis of historical cases 
suggested that resilience could be a helpful umbrella term that could combine three things: physical rebuilding, 
economic recovery, and post-traumatic emotional reconstitution. Still, whether by tracing the twin trajectories of 
east and West Berlin during the ideologically-driven urban interventions of the Cold War, or by examining the fate 
of Beirut after its Civil War, or mexico City after the 1985 earthquake, or los Angeles after the civil unrest of 1992, 
it was equally clear that urban residents within any given city have had highly differentiated experiences in the 
aftermath of traumatic events. Words such as resilience and recovery proved to be highly loaded terms.  
They did not just connote some obvious return to a better prior state—at least not for everyone. If a place was 
profoundly unequal before disaster struck, any sense of ‘bouncing back’ could mean a return to similarly unequal 
conditions. A disaster, in this sense, was a window into the structural inequalities of a society at the moment 
immediately prior to when the disaster struck. In this sense, we concluded, resilience is not always a good thing.
Resilience is, however, a popular thing. my own quick examination of “google trends” shows that, over the last 
decade, the term resilience is even gaining ground on the reigning icon of ubiquity, sustainability. It is not just a 
generic growth in resilience, though; there is a particular interest in linking resilience and urbanism.
Over the last decade, the term “resilient cities” has spread like wildfire (or like water through faulty levees), 
though I think it largely emerged simultaneously in several places. Since 2005, there have been more than a 
dozen books with some version of ‘resilient’ and ‘city’ in the title. In addition to our book, centered on disaster 
recovery, there has been a book about responding to peak oil and climate change, one on how cities respond to 
terrorism and security challenges, a volume on the economic impact of 9/11, and a primer on reducing coastal city 
vulnerabilities.
The concept of “resilient cities” appears as a guide to good design practice, a comprehensive action plan for 
communities, a handbook for local governments, a civic movement, and even a book on the relationship between 
public libraries and resilient cities—written by a planner/librarian.
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Books have been joined by multiplicity of conferences and conference reports, including the title of the 2013 joint 
AeSOP-ACSP Congress, annual Resilient Cities events by ICleI, and, of course, our current IPHS venture.
Foundations and international agencies have all jumped on board: macArthur developed its “resilient regions” 
initiative; Rockefeller has made “100 Resilient Cities” its signature program, and the United Nations and World 
Bank repeatedly deploy the term.
As the diverse books and reports and conferences and initiatives suggest, the single concept of “resilient cities” 
can connote a focus on urban security and counter-terrorism efforts, or on economic growth, employment, 
and supply chain management, or on building technology to withstand physical threats, or on particular 
institutions that serve neighborhoods, or on enhancing strong communities and social capital, or on government 
responsiveness to natural disasters or on infrastructure adaptation to climate change. And of course it can also 
be about libraries! This enormous range suggests either that resilience is excessively malleable as a term, yielding 
wildly divergent discussions about cities that have little to do with one another, or that the pairing of “resilient” 
and “city” usefully recognizes connections among subjects that genuinely ought to be considered together. 
Perhaps it is a lot of each.
In late 2014, geographer Tom Slater, a well-known scholar of gentrification, labeled “resilience” as “the latest 
policy and think tank abomination to infect and paralyse the study of cities,” noting that it “has become a research 
funding council priority all over the world.” Slater’s critique focuses on what he sees as the close connection 
between “resilience” as a seductive label and “neoliberal urbanism” as a dehumanizing and discriminatory 
practice. At base, Slater blames the notion of resilience for casting “an anesthetizing spell” upon low-income 
urban dwellers.2
A poster appearing in New Orleans in 2014--9 years after the devastation of Katrina--quickly gained notoriety in 
the twitterverse. On the poster, Tracie Washington from the louisiana Justice Institute complains: “Stop calling 
me Resilient. Because every time you say, ‘Oh, they’re resilient,’ that means you can do something else to me. I am 
not resilient.” Washington’s plea resonates with the academic language lamenting the alleged neoliberal capture 
of the term. Resilience, in this sense, describes the deliberate withdrawal of the state, coupled by complimentary 
(and complementary) reassurance that assistance from the state was not really needed. If non-elites are capable 
of coping on their own—forced into what is misleadingly called “self-sufficiency” because cannot rely on the 
state—this opens up terrain for additional forms of uncontested investment by the private sector. The language 
of resilience provides a seemingly empowering label for a process of double dispossession. First, low-income 
households are disproportionally victimized by a disaster and, second, they are again marginalized by the process 
of post-disaster investment.
Rather than dismiss the entire notion of resilience as no more than cover for cooptation by neoliberal disaster 
capitalism, however, I propose instead to embrace a notion of critical resilience. Historians of urban planning have 
long since found ways to disaggregate the experience of disaster recovery. Their accounts reveal both how elite 
interests gained disproportionately from many kinds of kinds of post-disaster investment, but also demonstrate 
how marginal groups attempted to cope, often revealing a deeply rooted resilience, even if it has not always been 
named as such. let me illustrate this with two brief examples—one from 19th century Chicago, and one from 21st 
century Banda Aceh, Indonesia.
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CHICAGO: URBAN RESILIENCE AFTER FIRE
The story of Chicago after the Great Fire of 1871 is usually related as a tale of boosters, with the post-fire landscape 
unleashing remarkable levels of economic growth. The new city thereby epitomizes the notion of disaster-as-
opportunity. Yet, amidst the rush to rebuild, the city sought to require fireproof construction within a large swath 
of the city known as the “fire limits.” By forcing everyone to construct new buildings out of expensive masonry, 
rather than repeat the pre-conflagration vulnerability of wooden dwellings, the city’s well-intentioned rules 
threatened to price out many low-income residents. The Great Fire had destroyed thousands of worker-owned 
wood cottages, and these homeowners, many of them recent immigrants, could do no more than hastily erect 
wooden shanties. As historian Karen Sawislak put it:
If the city legally barred a property holder from rebuilding with wood, and he or she could not afford brick or 
stone construction, this site lost all value for its owner. A lifetime of work and savings might evaporate.3
Chicago’s leaders had to sort out how to rebuild on a landscape of risk; increased regulation—banning wooden 
structures across the entire city-- would mean decreased affordability. And, in turn, the prospect of decreased 
affordability meant increased political pressure. Working-class Chicagoans viewed the proposed restrictions 
as something imposed by a cadre of downtown property owners who, already once-burned, wished to protect 
their investments by insisting that lower-income people should not build “fire-traps” anywhere else in the city. 
moreover, Sawislak shows, some ethnic groups viewed the restrictions as designed by nativist proponents intent 
on undermining their ability to rebuild as an ethnic enclave.
Violent protests against expanding the “fire limits” disrupted the City Council meeting in January 1872. Faced with 
this backlash, the city caved. The Council voted not to extend anti-wood restriction across city, leaving much of 
the north side and southwest side open to woodframe construction and, of equal importance, also failed to pass 
enforcement mechanisms. Today, visitors and locals alike extol the remarkable rise of Chicago School architecture 
from the 1880s and 1890s but skip over the fraught uncertainties of the 1870s. The resilience of post-Fire Chicago 
thus has a split personality: an elite voicing rational pleas about the civic duty to build back better, and a working 
class that successfully fought to protect the value of its investment in wooden homes and neighborhoods. This 
worked fine for some working class owners, but overall this yielded rapid construction of a shoddy city. Immigrant 
labor from elsewhere flooded in and kept jobs scarce for local workers; housing prices went up, making the city 
unaffordable for many who had been renters prior to the fire. Taking resilience critically means assessing the 
impacts on all income groups.
BANDA ACEH: URBAN RESILIENCE AFTER TSUNAMI
Few disasters can compare to the devastation caused by the tsunami that struck the north coast of Sumatra on 
December 26, 2004. Triggered by a 9.1 magnitude earthquake in the Indian Ocean, immense waves — some more 
than thirty meters high4 — swept through the Indonesian province of Aceh, leaving more than 163,000 people 
dead or missing, including 60,000 in the capital, Banda Aceh.5 It was the largest sudden loss of urban life in a 
generation, comparable to only a few disasters in modern history.6 more than 60 percent of Banda Aceh’s buildings 
were destroyed; entire coastal communities were swept away. In many villages, the vast majority of residents 
were killed, survivors left homeless, and children orphaned.7 Some 70 square kilometers of coastal land were left 
barren. Throughout this ruined terrain of mud, salt, and erosion, verifiable evidence of land tenure disappeared, 
as legal documents were lost and the tsunami’s power obliterated even “natural [boundary] markers like trees 
and footpaths.”8
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Following the tsunami, the government initially sought to prohibit permanent building construction on land 
within 2 kilometers of low-lying coastal areas. This revealed a narrow desire for resilient housing but ignored 
the close connection between housing location and place of employment. In response, public opposition to the 
government’s relocation proposal proved strong enough to get the government to shelve the plan. Viewed a 
decade later, Aceh has benefited greatly from new housing and neighborhoods built by a variety of NGOs to serve a 
broad range of incomes.9
Almost as staggering as the loss of life and livelihood was the challenge of rebuilding Banda Aceh from the ground 
up. In the months and years that followed, a rush of international aid — a wave of more than 500 groups that 
some have called the “second tsunami” — transformed the physical, cultural, and political landscape.10 That wave 
has since receded, leaving in its wake 140,000 new houses, 1,700 schools, nearly 1,000 government buildings, 36 
airports and seaports, and 3,700 kilometers of roads, funded by $12 billion in foreign support.11
Rather than focusing solely on reconstructing the physical city, or recharging the economy, or attending to the 
emotional needs of traumatized survivors, Banda Aceh’s planners and citizens have viewed recovery through 
multiple lenses. Housing recovery — let alone urban resilience — cannot be defined with simple metrics like the 
number of new units constructed.12 Housing that supports the resilience of cities entails providing far more than 
shelter but also a means of engaging improved quality of life in a city or village.13
At mIT, I direct the Resilient Cities Housing Initiative (RCHI—pronounced “Archie”) which seeks to draw 
attention to a global array of projects and programs that demonstrate ways that housing (broadly considered) 
can be a positive force for the resilience of cities.14 For RCHI, the resilience of cities refers to the capacity of urban 
areas to adjust and adapt to sudden shocks and longer term disruptions in ways that support and promote the 
well-being of all residents, particularly the least advantaged. Resilience is understood to be a capability that urban 
areas exhibit to differing degrees in response to various challenges, as opposed to a fixed condition or state. In 
such contexts, the engineer’s conception of resilience as “bounceback” is clearly not sufficient, and it can even 
be misleading. An equity-driven view of urban adaptation insists that cities cannot demonstrate resilience by 
channeling new investment aimed at the return to some predisruption status quo rooted in the marginalization 
of low-income groups. Instead, adjusting to external shocks entails a process of developing a more inclusive 
society that provides social, economic, and political support for the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, one key 
measure of resilience is how well low-income groups fare before, during, and after shocks.
To address this broader mission, housing must be conceptualized more holistically as a way to help low-income 
residents cope with four simultaneous challenges: (1) the persistence of economic livelihood struggle, (2) the 
dangerous environmental vagaries of a changing climate, (3) the impacts of urban violence and insecurity of 
tenure, and (4) the scourges of dysfunctional governance.
Beyond the initial provision of free dwellings to surviving households, the longer-term contribution of affordable 
housing requires that it afford access to economic livelihoods — either because it is co-located with a workplace, 
or because it is sited near employment opportunities that match the education and skill levels of inhabitants. Such 
housing also affords a healthy environment by reducing vulnerability to all manner of environmental hazards, 
from floodwaters to toxins. It affords both security of tenure but also personal and familial security, which is 
essential in a place like Aceh that has suffered not only traumatic disaster but also the political violence that 
accompanied a long separatist conflict. Finally, housing affords community empowerment and self-governance. 
New housing can bring together residents to negotiate community standards, norms, and expectations, and can 
create new forms of neighborhood association and village management.
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The rebuilding efforts followed a wide range of approaches. I distinguish three types: Blank Slate model Village, 
Inland Isolation, and Participatory Reconstruction, each of which offers implications for the notion of critical 
resilience and its relation to urban planning.
LAMBUNG: BLANK SLATE MODEL VILLAGE
When asked for a successful example of redevelopment, Banda Aceh officials inevitably point to Gampong lambung, 
considered a “model village” in large part because survivors followed the government’s reconstruction plan. located 
near the center of Banda Aceh and less than a kilometer from the coast on a flat deltaic plain, lambung could not 
have been more vulnerably situated. Of the village’s 5000 inhabitants and 700 households, only 60 people survived 
the 10 meter high waves caused by the tsunami — many because they were out fishing at the time.
The Indonesian government’s initial prohibition on permanent construction of new buildings within two 
kilometers of low-lying coastal areas15 would have required thousands of people, including the lambung 
survivors, to abandon their home communities and move away from sources of economic livelihood.16 This mode 
of “adaptation” is increasingly common in efforts to cope with climate change but the consequences often fall 
hardest on those with the least resources.17 While some lambung survivors chose to relocate, others refused to 
abandon their ancestral home. many returning residents embarked in a cooperative form of land readjustment 
that entailed a shared sense of community sacrifice and future vision, voluntarily ceding a portion of their land to 
make way for a better system of roads. In mid-2005, the government rescinded the building ban and the village 
was reconstructed on its original site. Survivors and their representatives agreed to a re-platting of the village. 
At its center is a new public space, an escape building donated by the Japanese Government, which doubles as a 
community center. The ground floor provides a badminton court, while other levels contain a performance stage, 
a wedding venue and a prayer area. From the roof, anyone can survey the reconstructed village and assess the 
relative turbulence of the sea.
The new Gampong lambung contains about 300 households, about half its prior size. most houses are elevated 
about a half-meter on concrete slabs, providing limited protection against future floods. Nevertheless, the continued 
existence of lambung is an affirmation of community will. Its residents have defended the idea that is possible to 
avoid disaster by ramping up a building, rather than by ramping up policies to remove coastal populations.
But if people continue to inhabit low-lying coastal areas like lambung, those systems will be tested repeatedly 
by climate change and rising seas. That has some wondering, wouldn’t it be more sensible to move all the villagers 
up into the hills?
JACKIE CHAN VILLAGE: INLAND ISOLATION
An imposing gateway spans the only road into the resettlement community known officially as the Indonesia-
China Friendship Village, dedicated in 2007. more commonly it is known as “Jackie Chan Village,” after the Hong 
Kong movie star who made a donation and paid a brief visit. located 300 meters above sea level and 1.5 kilometers 
inland, with expansive views of the ocean, the village elevates residents above the reach of any future wave. The 
Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) gave free houses to former homeowners displaced by the 
tsunami, as well as some former renters. A Chinese contractor built 606 houses, mostly single-family homes 
with yellow concrete walls and maroon metal roofs. Residents pay a modest charge for water and a share of 
electricity for the pump, equivalent to about $2.50 per month. Shared amenities include a kindergarten building, 
a village clinic, and a large covered concrete slab to accommodate an open market that, unfortunately, has never 
functioned properly.
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When it opened, the resettlement village rehoused some 2,400 people, an unusually diverse community that 
included about 100 Chinese households, as well as Acehnese, mixed Acehnese-Javanese, and other ethnicities. A 
survey conducted three years after resettlement found that most residents were satisfied with the houses and 
valued them almost as highly as their pre-tsunami homes, even though they were smaller. However, the village’s 
remote location, seventeen kilometers from Banda Aceh, creates employment pressures for the fishermen, becak 
drivers, traders, service workers, and small-scale entrepreneurs who resettled here. As Village Chief Wahid told 
our team, there is “nothing they can earn a living on here based on their skills.”18
Within a few years, half the population left. Some moved closer to Banda Aceh but are still registered as living in 
the new village, and local officials seem to tolerate it when they rent out their village homes. Jackie Chan Village 
is an attractive settlement with flawed logic. It is a notable example of cooperation and commitment between the 
Acehnese and the Chinese governments, a cohesive, integrated village construction effort in contrast to the often 
hodgepodge cases with multiple houses by multiple aid agencies elsewhere. Its privileged siting offers safety and 
beauty. Resettlement policies by the BRR fostered diversity in a region previously wracked by conflict. And yet, 
its very distinction, its separation, creates difficulties for infrastructure provision and, most critically, poses often 
insurmountable challenges for the maintenance of livelihoods.
UpLINK COMMUNITIES: pARTICIpATORY RECONSTRUCTION
A third type of approach underscores the full value of a critical approach to resilient urbanism, by revealing the role 
of housing recovery in promoting community involvement and local governance. Soon after the tsunami, the anti-
poverty network Uplink Banda Aceh (UBA) took the strong stance that villagers should be encouraged to rebuild 
where they previously lived. At a time when most NGOs abided by the government’s “no-build zone,” UBA organized 
protests against the regulation and provided temporary shelter, food, and cooking supplies in coastal villages, 
rather than limiting food provision to refugee camps as the government preferred. With international funding, they 
quickly developed resident-driven reconstruction practices in 23 villages in and around Banda Aceh. They worked 
directly with community members to plan and rebuild housing and infrastructure, including community centers and 
mosques.19 most international donors, according to a report by the Tsunami and Disaster mitigation Research Center, 
“viewed the tsunami victims as the objects, rather than the subjects, of the aid. They thought of the tsunami victims 
as weak, so most of the aid programs were targeted to short-term needs and physical projects and took a paternalistic 
attitude, and the format of the aid was not in accordance with local needs.” UBA embodied a very different philosophy, 
that “outside parties who want to help disaster victims should empower the communities and consider the role of 
local institutions, so that community rebuilding post-disaster is initiated by the local people themselves.”20
In march 2005, UBA helped form Jaringan Udeep Beusaree (JUB), a grassroots organization whose name means 
“the village solidarity network.” Together, they documented pre-tsunami village demographic characteristics, 
including the residential history and employment experience of survivors, so that they could better target 
recovery efforts.21 By that summer, UBA and its partners had salvaged enough wood from the tsunami debris to 
construct 450 temporary shelters across 23 villages, the first step in a participatory effort to plan and build more 
than 3,000 permanent homes by February 2007.22 While global organizations such as the World Bank were still 
arguing about processes for hiring people to certify land holdings in advance of any actual reconstruction, UBA 
had already surveyed villages, obtained local buy-in, and started building.
Jakarta architect marco Kusumawijaya worked with UBA between march and September 2005, and was in Banda 
Aceh when the government declared that residents should not return to coastal areas. “We defied that,” he told us. 
“We organized people to go back, and did 3,000 houses before the World Bank started.”23 UBA’s activism helped turn 
public opinion against the government policy. Faced with the political and logistical problem of relocating 20,000 
families in coastal communities, starting in mid-2005 the BRR stepped back from strict adherence to the policy.24
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As coastal rebuilding began, most architects “wanted a ‘clean slate’ like lambung,” but Kusumawijaya urged his 
colleagues to learn from the structure of the original villages. He admired the village road pattern and mosque-
centered layout and felt “it would be wrong to erase this.” UBA teams worked with residents to preserve attributes 
of the coastal villages, but also advocated for enhancements like better escape roads and access to quality land that 
could permit a move to higher elevations. They imported laser-guided total station surveying equipment to define 
plot boundaries supported by community consensus and witness accounts.
Throughout the recovery, UBA teams refused to limit their role to the construction of housing and infrastructure. 
Physical rebuilding, they contended, was merely the entry point for capacity building, self-determination, and 
psychological healing. The residents managed construction of their own homes, as UBA sought to rebuild not 
just housing, but trust. They organized art therapy programs and social events. They also helped restore income-
generating opportunities. much of the farmland was damaged by saltwater, so they taught villagers how to make 
compost and fertilizer and connected farmers with techniques for enhancing agricultural productivity in high-
salinity soil.25
As part of a menu of five different earthquake-resistant house designs, UBA offered villagers the possibility of two-
story homes raised above the ground. This design offered greater protection from floodwaters or minor tsunamis, 
while yielding a covered, protected space on the ground floor that could be used to store fishing and farming 
equipment or support a small business. The emphasis on resident input and involvement served to empower 
communities and enhance their capacity to share in their own governance throughout the reconstruction 
process. This simultaneous attention to physical reconstruction, economic recovery and emotional reconstitution 
exemplifies what is possible if one takes a holistic approach to critical resilience. It seems a far cry from the 
cynicism that assumes resilience can be no more than a rhetorical pawn of neoliberalism.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS CRITICAL RESILIENCE
In looking at the city-region as a whole, a critical approach to resilience avoids the temptation to view recovery 
only from the point of view of the most advantaged elites. In 19th-century Chicago and 21st century Banda Aceh, 
as in many other past instances, taking a critical approach to resilience helps us see how “building back better” 
is not some purely mechanical operation. Rather, by drawing on a definition of resilience that embraces not just 
economic recovery and architectural reconstruction but also issues of emotional reconstitution, it is possible to 
get beyond the facile judgment that resilience must necessarily connote neoliberal property interests run amok.
Once one takes the time to ask questions such as “whose resilience? and “whose city?” it becomes possible to 
show how rebuilding agendas operate on class and ethnic lines, and reveal ways that elected governments struggle 
over how to represent the public interest.26 In terms of the physical built environment, critical approaches to 
resilience similarly facilitate discussions of how ideological commitments to homeownership may dominate public 
policy, and may illuminate tensions over the regulation of risky construction. And, seen through its economic 
dimension, a critical perspective on resilience can clarify whose jobs benefit—and whose do not-- from post-
trauma employment patterns. At base, Critical resilience entails a willingness to seek ways to “bounce forward,” 
not merely bounce back.27
In examining how various communities responded to disaster, it seems clear that different constituencies defined 
“recovery” differently and prioritized readiness for future threats in different ways. At the same time, however, 
they exhibited some common tactics and strategies, indirectly revealing the operation of resilience-seeking 
behavior even if they did not actually make use of “resilience” as a term. I have suggested that resilience takes 
place in at least three domains simultaneously: the physical restoration of the built environment, the pecuniary 
restoration of the economy, and the emotional resuscitation of individuals and families. City leaders consistently 
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attempt to steer a sense of resilience through three kinds of constructed acts: 1) efforts to manage the dominant 
narrative about the state of recovery (Who gets to tell the story?), 2) initiatives to highlight conspicuous symbolic 
milestones of recovery (Which projects signal a comeback?), and 3) attempts to negotiate and control the politics 
of redevelopment (Who benefits from available funding?). At the same time, however, taking a critical approach 
to resilience means listening for non-elite voices, too. Despite the differentiated landscape of urban recovery, we 
frequently ignore the obvious clues about narrative voice (or lack thereof), architectural symbolism, and political 
favoritism.
Ultimately, if resilience is to be useful concept for urbanists seeking to learn from past and present practices, we 
need a definition of resilience that re-knits disciplinary strands that are too often kept separate. Resilience needs 
to include elements of physical bounceback, socio-economic networking, and psychological recovery. If historians 
of city and regional planning are to shape resilience into a useful term, we need to integrate the insights and 
approaches from engineers, ecologists, economists, and psychologists—all of whom—like the classic story of blind 
men trying to describe the elephant—have identified parts of the phenomenon but missed seeing the totality. 
Beyond this, however, resilience theory can only become a viable guide for resilience practice if there is an ethical 
imperative to ensure that the benefits of urban investment in resilience are equitably shared by those who have 
suffered the most or who are poised to face such dire consequences in the foreseeable future. examples from the 
past consistently show uneven resilience, so it does no good to speak simplistically about an entire resilient city. 
Giving resilience a strongly normative dimension--one that asks tough questions about winners and losers and 
that learns from past examples--offers the best hope for making ‘resilience’ useful to ‘urbanism’. I very much hope 
we can do that.
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